Матеріали автора Yuliia Dukach

The benefits of studying disinformation on YouTubeYouTube is one of the most popular social media in Poland and Ukraine: two-thirds of the people in each country have an active account and use the platform to watch entertainment and informational content. The recommendation algorithm is the heart of YouTube: personalized, high-quality selections of similar videos keep viewers on the platform to maximize advertising profits and help users find videos of interest more easily.Читати українською

Ryzyko zetknięcia się z dezinformacją na YouTube w Polsce jest niższe niż na Ukrainie. Pierwszą rzeczą, która chroni Polaków przed dezinformacją i rosyjskojęzycznymi treściami, jest brak znajomości języka rosyjskiego. Polski obszar informacyjny jest również chroniony przed dezinformacją przez prawo UE oraz zachowania i preferencje samych użytkowników, którzy oglądają znacznie mniej wiadomości na YouTube niż Ukraińcy. Wciąż jednak istnieją szare strefy i słabe punkty samej platformy, które zbadaliśmy, prosząc ponad 100 polskich wolontariuszy o zainstalowanie naszej aplikacji i zbieranie wszystkich rekomendowanych przez YouTube treści w ciągu dwóch miesięcy.

We have investigated the non-political segment of TikTok to understand whether Russian influences are penetrating through the entertainment content of this network. The weakest link is humor.TikTok shows Ukrainians videos of Russian stand-up comedians, and often it's "Zadornov-style" humor, mocking the West.Читати українською

The risk of encountering disinformation on YouTube in Poland is lower than in Ukraine. The primary shield against disinformation and Russian-language content for Poles is their lack of proficiency in Russian. 

outube has long earned the reputation of a convenient and reliable service. Two out of three Ukrainians come here for entertainment and educational content, but they also use it to watch the news and follow the twists and turns of Ukraine's political life. The recommendation algorithm is the “heart” of YouTube. In a nutshell, the better recommendations the platform offers, the more time its users spend watching videos and the more money they bring to the advertisers by watching their adverts.

At the end of October 2022, we published a data project about the Russian "Telegram occupation", in which we investigated 120 Telegram channels that were set up by the Russians under the guise of Ukrainian local news channels to prepare for and justify the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories. However, things didn’t turn out as planned, and by the end of September 2022, almost half of these news channels stopped working. As we learnt later on, not forever. Some Telegram channels still got a chance for a second life, although again, not for long. More details about Russian activity in Telegram and what Soledar offensive has got to do with it – in the article below.

Russia likes to use children in propaganda. Back in the Soviet times, many books and paintings featured Lenin with children. Stalin also liked to be surrounded by happy kids, at least for the purpose of political campaigns. Putin's Russia is creatively continuing this tradition. While in the Russian Federation children from kindergartens to technical schools are lined up in the letter "Z" shape or asked to draw a St. George's ribbon, Ukrainian children in the occupied cities (including the recently liberated Kherson) are forced to become living proof of the "happy occupation."Translated by Dmitry Lytov & Mike LytovRead this article in Ukrainian

At the beginning of March, right after the full-scale invasion, Russian information troops targeted regional centers of Ukraine by creating dedicated Telegram channels for each township or community. Although each one posed as a source of local news, those channels were in fact used to disseminate Russian narratives and bolster support for the occupiers. The administrators also used them to imitate such support from the locals.Читати українською